

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: NOV 2004

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٠	he Soviet reply appears to have been carefully draited to include numerous ambiguities which could be used in the future as the basis for either a strong Soviet reaction in support of the North Koreans or eschewing any direct involvement. the Kremlin undoubtedly is closely watching mintary developments in Korea and that the crucial stage in the determination of the Soviet course will be reached when		
	the military situation turns in favor of South Korea.		
3.	Soviet public reaction to the Korean conflict		
,	the initial Soviet press and radio reports on the Korean war were received by the average	2.	
	Soviet citizen with a calmness bordering on apathy.		
	although news of US intervention caused considerable surprise and "more than a trace of alarm,"		
	the Soviet press and radio treatment of the US action		
	created the general impression that the USSR is not directly		
	involved and does not intend to become involved, thus appar-		
	ently allaying the almost pathological fear of war among		
	Soviet citizens. The average	٠.	
	Muscovite would prefer to see the matter settled quickly and considers the outcome of minor importance. As a		
	further measure of public reaction,		
	there were no indications of hoarding or excessive buying		
•	in the Moscow area.		
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	FAR EAST	. , ,	
4.	BURMA: Nationalist troops create problem Prime Minister Thakin Nu		
	and other Burmese officials are becoming increasingly concerned over the activity of approximately 2000 former Chines	e ·	_

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Nationalist troops in the Kengtung area. The Burmese officials state that these troops, which are remnants of the 26th Nationalist Chinese Army, are becoming more truculent and are too well armed to be forcibly interned by present Burmese forces. The Burmese officials point out that, although the Chinese Communists have given assurances that they would not send troops into Burma to disarm the Nationalists, the Communists are insisting that the Government of Burma intern the Nationalist elements. The Burmese officials fear that the situation may sooner or later provide the Chinese Communists with reasonable grounds for incursion.

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